Helping others or helping oneself? International subsidies and the provision of global public goods by Abul Naga, R H & Jones, P
        
Citation for published version:
Abul Naga, RH & Jones, P 2013, 'Helping others or helping oneself? International subsidies and the provision of
global public goods', Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 856-875. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gps044
DOI:
10.1093/oep/gps044
Publication date:
2013
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title]
following peer review. The version of record Abul Naga, R. H., & Jones, P. (2013). Helping others or helping
oneself? International subsidies and the provision of global public goods. Oxford Economic Papers, 65(4), 856-
875 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1093/oep/gps044
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Dec. 2019
c© Oxford University Press 2011
All rights reserved.
Oxford Economic Papers 6 (2011), 1—22 1
doi:10.1093/oep/flr001
Helping Others or Helping Oneself?
International Subsidies and the
Provision of Global Public Goods
By Ramses H. Abul Naga∗ and Philip Jones†
∗ Business School, Health Economics Research Unit and European
Centre for Labour Market Research, University of Aberdeen,
Aberdeen AB24 3QY, UK ; e-mail: r.abulnaga@abdn.ac.uk
†Department of Economics, University of Bath. Bath, BA2 7AY,
UK
This paper explores the welfare effects of international subsidies designed
to expedite the production of global public goods. It distinguishes between
the impact subsidies exert on behaviour and the impact subsidies exert on
welfare. Subsidies that encourage recipients to contribute to the provision
of global public goods can be designed to maximise the welfare of donor
countries. While these optimal subsidies achieve a Pareto efficient allocation
of resources, all the efficiency gains are appropriated by donor countries. If
equity is irrelevant, optimal subsidies are higher for high-income recipients
than for low-income recipients.
JEL classifications: H87 H41.
1. Introduction
Nation states must act collectively if they are to make a
meaningful response to global challenges. Global challenges take
different forms. Diseases are disseminated internationally, financial
instabilities are transmitted across integrated markets and climate
changes threaten the world environment. Nation states produce
global public goods when their response provides benefits that are
experienced worldwide (Sandler 2003:131).
Nation states’ willingness to act collectively depends on the
nature of the public good to be produced (Sandler 2004) and
on incentives provided by international treaties. International
collaboration is more successful when treaties offer side-payments
to mobilise collective action (e.g. Barrett 1999, 2003). The
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Montreal Protocol offers assistance to countries that agree to
reduce emissions from ozone-depleting substances. The Global
Environmental Facility assists countries that use expensive substi-
tutes for fossil fuels and practice energy conservation. The Group
of Seven and the European Union offers subsidies to countries to
reduce the risk of nuclear accidents. The World Heritage Fund
provides subsidies to countries to protect their national heritage
when this also generates global benefits. More recently, the U.N.
Climate Change Conference at Cancun has agreed to establish a
Green Climate Fund and, by 2020, this Fund will disburse $100
billion to help countries reduce carbon emissions and to help
countries adapt to climate change.
The extent to which these subsidies can be described as aid
is moot. When King (2006: 371) reflected on subsidies offered to
cover incremental costs (i.e. the "...additional costs of pursuing
one course of action rather than another.."), he insisted that these
payments "...are not conventional aid..."; they are provided to
make "...international co-operation more incentive compatible".
Sandler (1997) drew attention to the proportion of bilateral and
multilateral aid transfers that are offered to encourage developing
countries to contribute to the provision of global public goods
(e.g. to encourage developing countries to sustain rain forests, or
to administer the vaccination programmes required to eradicate
disease). These transfers are increasing as a share of official
overseas development assistance, but it is far from obvious that
they should be described as aid (Raffer 1999; World Bank 2001,
te Velde et al 2002; Anand 2004; UNIDO 2008).
In this paper the objective is to explore the welfare effects of
international subsidies offered to mobilise collective action. Will
they increase the provision of a global public good? Will they
achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources? Will they ensure
that every nation state that responds to a global challenge receives
a meaningful share of the efficiency gains delivered by collective
action?
An established literature already explores the impact of income
redistribution on the supply of a public good. Some question
whether lump sum transfers are likely to have any impact
at all (e.g. Warr 1983; Bergstrom et al 1986). Others focus
on the question of whether governments are able to rely on
distortionary taxation to increase the supply of a public good (e.g.
Bernheim 1986). In this context, Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996)
demonstrate that governments can offer tax-financed subsidies to
increase the provision of a public good if voluntary contributors
take the government’s budget constraint into account.
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This paper has a narrower remit. It focuses on voluntary co-
operation between nation states that respect each others’ national
sovereignty (there is no international government able to levy
coercive taxation). In this paper the question is whether treaties
and aid packages can be designed to mobilise collective action. The
intention is to analyse the impact of subsidies in treaties when
treaties are analysed as stylised tax-subsidy arrangements.
In the absence of an international government, tax is the cost
that the nation state incurs when it voluntarily signs a treaty. It
is possible to analyse treaties that impose a cost as a tax payment
to a common budget (to finance the provision of a global public
good). It is also possible to analyse treaties that impose a tax
(more generally) as a direct cost that must be incurred to fulfil
treaty obligations. As an example, consider the cost that nation
states incur when they agree to reduce carbon emissions (in order
to fulfil their obligations to an international environment treaty).
The same stylised tax-subsidy model can be applied if nation states
make tax payments to a common fund, or if nation states incur tax
costs as direct contributions to provide a public good. This paper
analyses tax costs as contributions to produce a global public good
with a summation technology (Sandler 2004).
The next section of the paper illustrates the main issues
by focussing on the cost-sharing arrangement implicit in an
international treaty. A developed country (country 1) is able to
offer a cost-sharing arrangement to induce a developing country
(country 2) to make a contribution to the provision of a global
public good, even when the developing country is able to free-
ride on the provision of the global public good by the developed
country. Studies have already considered the impact of cost-
sharing arrangements on the supply of a public good (Guttman
1978; 1987 considers a cost-sharing arrangement in a two-stage
game) but, in this paper, the intention is to focus on the
distribution of the efficiency gains that collective action can
deliver.
Section three of the paper considers the properties of the tax-
subsidy arrangement that mobilises collective action to deliver all
of the efficiency gains to the country that pays the subsidy. The
two-country model is generalised to an n country model. Counter-
intuitively, only the donor country (the country that pays the
subsidy) gains (even though collective action successfully produces
a Pareto-efficient quantity of the public good).
Section four of the paper focuses on the pattern of subsidies
when donor countries mobilise collective action and appropriate
all of the efficiency gains. The pattern of subsidies differs
systematically from the pattern that would emerge if donor
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countries’ only concern was to alleviate poverty in developing
countries.
More generally, section five of the paper considers the properties
of international treaties that mobilise collective action to deliver
a meaningful share of the welfare gains to every country that acts
collectively.
Commentators are critical that international subsidies offered
to developing countries to induce them to act collectively are
not really offering aid. They are concerned that these subsidies
are displacing conventional aid. This paper identifies an even
more worrying concern. International subsidies can be offered to
mobilise developing countries and to maximise the welfare of the
countries that pay the subsidies. They can be designed to deliver
all of the efficiency gains to the countries that pay the subsidies.
This observation is important. It is not sufficient to argue that
citizens in developing countries value the global public good. It
is not sufficient to argue that countries that receive subsidies
are always able to reject the offer of subsidies. The message to
policymakers is that it is necessary to examine the properties of
tax-subsidy arrangements implicit in international treaties. When
are they likely to mobilise collective action? When are they likely
to deliver all of the welfare gains to the nation states that pay
international subsidies?
2. International subsidies to mobilise developing
countries.
In this section of the paper the intention is to illustrate the welfare
effects of a subsidy offered by a developed country (country 1) to
encourage a developing country (country 2) to contribute to the
provision of a global public good (x). In countries 1 and 2, citizens
derive utility from a global public good x and from a private
good y. We follow the usual convention by assuming that each
country maximises a utility function that is “. . . representative of
the welfare of the nation’s population” (Sandler 1993:449).
To begin, consider the way that a developed country might
induce a developing country to contribute to the provision of x
even though the developed country already provides x¯ unilaterally.
Letm1 andm2 denote the incomes of countries 1 and 2. The utility
levels of the two countries are:
u1(x¯,m1−x¯) = u¯1 (1)
u2(x¯,m2) = u¯2 (2)
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where we assume that the marginal cost of production is equal
to one. This starting point resembles the problem discussed
by developed countries at the UN Climate Conferences in
Copenhagen and Cancun. Many developed countries are already
committed to measures to reduce carbon emissions (as signatories
to the Kyoto Protocol). At the Copenhagen Conference (December
2009) their objective was to encourage developing countries to
make a similar commitment. They decided to offer developing
countries subsidies if developing countries would also agree to incur
costs to mitigate the problem of global warming.
In Figure 1 the marginal cost of providing the global public good
(x) isMC. Country 1, or country 2, can pay the full marginal costs
of providing the good, or both can agree to share the marginal
cost. If they agree to share the marginal costs, country 1 would
pay a cost-share between τ0
1
and τ100
1
(on the vertical axis) and
country 2 would pay the remaining cost-share between (1−τ01) and
(1−τ100
1
).
The indifference curves illustrate the preferences of each country.
At any output, country 1 is better off on indifference curve I2
1
than
on I1
1
because country 1 pays a lower tax share for each unit of x
(conversely, at any output, country 2 is worse off on indifference
curves that lie below I1
2
). The initial situation is point a. Country 1
provides x1= x¯ units (at point a country 1’s marginal benefit of the
public good equals marginal cost). At point a country 2 benefits as
a free rider. Can a cost-sharing arrangement be designed to induce
country 2 to act collectively?
Both countries might enjoy a higher welfare level by acting
collectively. There are potential efficiency gains if they agree to
share costs to produce a higher level of output. In Figure 1 each
country can achieve a higher level of welfare in the ellipse described
between points a and c. These efficiency gains are maximised
if countries chose a cost-sharing arrangement at a point on the
contract curve (not drawn) in the ellipse. When the slopes of the
indifference curves are identical, Samuelson’s (1954) conditions are
satisfied (Mueller 2003).
The question is whether there is a process that will mobilise
collective action. In theory, it is possible to rely on the process
described by Lindahl (1919). An impartial auctioneer suggests
a cost-sharing arrangement and asks each country if it prefers
more, or less, of the public good. By a tâtonnement process, the
auctioneer increases the cost-share for the country that prefers a
higher output of the public good, and decreases the cost-share for
the country that prefers a lower output. If there is a cost-sharing
arrangement at which neither country has a preference for more, or
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less, of the good, the outcome is Pareto optimal (Johansen 1963).
The cost-shares are Lindahl prices; at these prices each nation
state equates its marginal benefit to its marginal cost. To achieve
a Lindahl equilibrium, each country must answer honestly, even
though there are incentives to under-reveal demand (Cornes and
Sandler 1996).
By comparison, the process considered in this paper is quite
different. In the first instance, it is the developed country that
takes the initiative. As it is the convention that a donor (prepared
to pay the subsidy) offers a subsidy, the developed country enjoys a
first move advantage. The developed country acts as a Stackelberg
leader.1
The second difference is that, when the developed country
sets the subsidy, it is also able to determine the cost-sharing
arrangement. As each country’s cost-share depends on the mix of
tax and subsidy, the developed country is able to set the subsidy to
determine the cost-sharing arrangement (receipt of the subsidy is
contingent on willingness to pay an agreed tax contribution to the
public good). If the developed country sets the subsidy to ensure
that every nation shares the efficiency gains delivered by collective
action, the cost-sharing arrangement will leave each country on
the contract curve within the ellipse (described between points a
and c). However, the developed country can also set the subsidy
to maximise its own welfare on the contract curve at point b in
Figure 1.
3. International subsidies that maximize donors’
welfare.
How can a cost-sharing arrangement be produced to mobilise
collective action at point b in Figure 1? In this section of the paper
attention focuses on the properties of a tax-subsidy arrangement
to maximize the welfare of the country that pays the subsidy.
Country 1 and country 2 consume y1 and y2 of the private good.
The analysis is premised on the following assumptions:
[Assumption 1] u1(x,y1) and u2(x,y2) are increasing quasi-
concave functions.
[Assumption 2] the cost function of the public good is linearly
increasing and is given by c(x)=x, where the constant marginal
cost of production equals one.
...............................................................................................
1Participation in the Lindahl process is different. When the auctioneer
suggests different cost-sharing arrangements there is no suggestion that the
donor country is more likely to reap all of the efficiency gains.
R. H. ABUL NAGA AND P. JONES 7
[Assumption 3] m1≥m2 and
∂u1
∂x
(x,y1)>
∂u2
∂x
(x,y2) for all x>
0.
[Assumption 4]
∂u1
∂x
(0,m1)=∞ for all y1≥0.
[Assumption 5] Country 1 makes a once for all (take it or leave
it) offer that country 2 accepts or rejects.
[Assumption 6] lump-sum transfers of wealth between the two
countries are not available.
A1-A2 are standard assumptions that ensure that the first
order conditions for Pareto efficiency are sufficient. Assumption
A3 ensures that in a decentralized country decision process, (the
competitive equilibrium where each country takes as given the
amount of x purchased by the other country), only country 1
spends on the public good while country 2 free-rides. Assumption
A4 ensures that there is always a finite amount of x consumed. A5
amounts to assuming that the two countries play a Stackelberg
game. This assumption is relaxed in section 5 where we consider
treaties that allow country 2 to be strictly better off than under
(2). In a theoretical world lump-sum contributions T1 and T2 are
possible but here the analysis focuses on tax contributions that
are proportional to incomes (m1 and m2) in the two countries.
A6 is thus introduced to capture some realism in international
negotiations.
The feature that is common in the treaties analysed in this paper
is the per-unit subsidy s ∈ [0,1] paid by the developed country to
the developing country. As noted, the tax element in the treaty is
the cost that a signatory agrees to incur to produce a global public
good. To begin, it is helpful to focus on a tax rate, t, that depends
on income:
(i) If the costs of providing the global public good are
financed by a common budget, the tax is the payment that each
country contributes to the budget. When the tax rate is t, each
country contributes tm1 and tm2 respectively. Total tax revenue
(tm1+ tm2) together with the subsidy sx (paid by the developed
country) is available to finance the provision of the global public
good.
(ii) If the costs of providing the public good are incurred
as direct costs (to fulfil treaty obligations), the direct contribution
costs are tm1 and tm2. These are the tax costs that country 1
and country 2 incur directly (e.g. by reducing carbon emissions).
With a summation technology these contributions, tm1 and tm2,
together with the subsidy sx, are available to produce the global
public good.
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The analysis begins with the assumption that the developed
country will incur a higher cost (tm1) than the developing
country (tm2). This may often be the case (e.g. in international
environment treaties, the costs of reducing carbon emissions are
likely to be higher in countries that have higher industrial output).
It is also the case that the argument in this paper is stronger if it
appears to be the case that the donor country is willing to accept
higher tax costs. In section 5 of the paper this assumption (that
nation state contributions are linear functions of income) can be
relaxed.
The first objective is to compare welfare effects when a
developed country ‘generously’ offers to incur a higher cost (tm1>
tm2) and to finance a subsidy sx. If the developed country (country
1) is intent on maximising its own utility, it will offer a treaty
that will (at minimum) maintain country 2’s initial welfare. If u¯2
is the utility country 2 achieves while free-riding, the resulting
participation constraint from the perspective of country 1 is:
u2[x,m2(1−t)]= u¯2. (3)
such that,
dt
dx
|u¯2=
1
m2
∂u2/∂x
∂u2/∂y2
(4)
As this quantity is positive, country 1 will only raise the tax rate
t in exchange for an agreement that there will be a higher level of
global activity. If the total cost of production is simply the sum of
individual contributions, the resource constraint takes the form:
t(m1+m2)+sx=x (5)
The developed country’s objective (country 1) is to maximize, by
choice of x,t and s, its utility function u1[x,m1(1−t)−sx] subject
to the above participation and resource constraints.
When focussing on the properties of the optimal tax-subsidy
mechanism that maximises the donor country’s welfare, let µ
denote the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint,
and let λ denote the corresponding multiplier on the resource
constraint. The associated Lagrangian for the optimum choice of
x,t and s, from the perspective of country 1, can thus be written
as follows:
L(x,t,s;µ,λ) = u1[x,m1(1−t)−sx]+ (6)
+µ[u2[x,m2(1−t)]−u¯2]+
+λ[t(m1+m2)−x(1−s)]
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First order conditions for the optimum choice of x, t and s entail:
∂L
∂x
=
∂u1
∂x
+µ
∂u2
∂x
−
∂u1
∂y1
s−λ(1−s)=0 (7)
∂L
∂t
= −m1
∂u1
∂y1
−µm2
∂u2
∂y2
+λ(m1+m2)=0 (8)
∂L
∂s
= −
∂u1
∂y1
x+λx=0 (9)
By defining Π(x,y)=
∂u/∂x
∂u/∂y
as the marginal rate of substitution
between the two goods, we obtain the following result (see the
appendix for a derivation):
Proposition 1 There exists a Pareto efficient treaty (xˆ,tˆ,sˆ)
such that the donor country reaps all the welfare gains. At the
point (xˆ,tˆ,sˆ) satisfying the first order conditions [7-9]above, we
have the equalities
Π1
(
xˆ,m1(1− tˆ)−sˆxˆ
)
+Π2
(
xˆ,m2(1− tˆ)
)
= 1 (10)
λ =
∂u1
∂y1
(11)
µ =
∂u1/∂y1
∂u2/∂y2
(12)
where Πi is the marginal rate of substitution of country i between
the global public good and disposable income and 1 is the marginal
cost of production of the global public good x.
The role of the subsidy is crucial in ensuring that the Samuelson
condition (10) characterizing Pareto efficiency of the solution
( xˆ,tˆ,sˆ) is satisfied. In the absence of a subsidy, s=0, the first
order condition (9) does not arise and the terms s∂u1/∂y1 and
λs vanish from (7). In the resulting optimum a weighted sum of
the marginal rates of substitution of the two countries is equated
to the marginal cost of production, thus breaking the required
Samuelson optimality condition2 . It should then be clear that in
the framework of Proposition 1, aid would have little to do with
altruism, or caring for country 2. Instead, aid, i.e. the subsidy, is
used as a corrective mechanism to mitigate the distortion that is
caused by free-riding behaviour.
...............................................................................................
2More specifically, in the absence of subsidies we obtain
λ=θ1
∂u1
∂y1
+µθ2
∂u2
∂y2
where θi=mi/(m1+m2). The optimum level of x then equates the sum of
marginal utilities
∂u1
∂x
+µ
∂u2
∂x
to this resulting value of λ.
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Define v1(m1,m2,u¯2)=u1( xˆ,tˆ,sˆ) as country 1’s maximized
utility function in relation to the problem (6). We state below
properties of v1(m1,m2,u¯2) which will be further explored in the
sections below:
Corollary 1 Let v1(m1,m2,u¯2) denote country 1’s indirect
utility function. Then
(i)
∂v1
∂m2
=λ>0
(ii)
∂v1
∂u¯2
=−µ<0
so that country 1’s welfare is increasing in country 2’s income,
and decreasing in country 2’s reservation utility.
Thus, other things equal, country 1 would benefit more by
engaging in a treaty with a richer free-riding country. Furthermore,
since
∂v1
∂u¯2
<0, there would appear to be a range of Pareto-efficient
treaties, some of which may increase country 2’s welfare. One
such case is a treaty where both countries share the welfare gains
(section 5).
3.1 A multi-country world.
The above results are robust when generalising the model beyond
a two-country world. We consider a world consisting of two
homogeneous groups of countries, say North and South, where
within each group preferences and endowments are identical 3 .
Specifically, we assume there are n1 rich countries with incomes
m1 and identical preferences u1(x,m1) and n2 poor countries with
incomes m2 and identical preferences u2(x,m2)
4 .
There are now n2 identical participation constraints, for each
type 2 country, identical to (3), while the new resource constraint
is of the form:
t(n1m1+n2m2)=x(1−n1s) (13)
The associated Lagrangian with the global community consisting
of n1 rich countries and n2 poor countries is:
L = u1(x,m1(1−t)−sx) (14)
+µ[u2(x,m2(1−t))−u¯2]
+λ[t(n1m1+n2m2)−x(1−n1s)]
...............................................................................................
3The authors are grateful for the advice that an anonymous referee offered on
the approach that might be employed to analyse a multi-country model.
4The assumption of two homogeneous groups is further relaxed in section 5
where we consider various generalisations of our analysis.
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First order conditions for the optimum choice of x,t, and s entail:
∂L
∂x
=
∂u1
∂x
−s
∂u1
∂y1
+µ
∂u2
∂x
−λ(1−n1s)=0 (15)
∂L
∂t
= −m
∂u1
∂y1
−m2µ
∂u2
∂y2
+λ(n1m1+n2m2)=0 (16)
∂L
∂s
= −
∂u1
∂y1
x+n1λx=0 (17)
Letting Πi denote a representative country i
′s marginal rate
of substitution, we generalize the result of Proposition 1 in the
context of a multi-country world as follows:
Proposition 2 There exists a Pareto efficient treaty such that
the donor community reaps all the welfare gains. At the point(
xˆ,tˆ,sˆ
)
satisfying the first order conditions [15−17] above, we have
the equalities
n1Π1
(
xˆ,m1
(
1− tˆ
)
− sˆxˆ
)
+n2Π2
(
xˆ,m2
(
1− tˆ
))
= 1 (18)
λ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
(19)
µ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
/
1
n2
∂u2
∂y2
(20)
Once again, the optimum is the Samuelson condition (18) that
characterizes Pareto efficiency. The weighted sum of marginal
rates of substitution equals the marginal rate of transforma-
tion. The bilateral model (discussed earlier) is helpful when
analysing bilateral aid arrangements. The multi-country model
can be employed when exploring the properties of tax-subsidy
arrangements in multilateral international treaties. The multi-
country model illustrates the advantage that developed countries
are able to exploit as countries that offer subsidies (as altruists,
able to determine implicit cost-sharing arrangements). Even in the
multi-country model, developed countries can offer cost-sharing
arrangements that are designed to maximise their own welfare.
4. International subsidies when developing countries’
incomes increase.
In section 3 of the paper a developed country (country 1)
encouraged a developing country (country 2) to commit resources
to provide a public good and to appropriate all of the efficiency
gains. How will s and t change as the developing country becomes
richer? How will they change if the marginal utility a developing
country derives from the public good increases at all levels of x?
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When we parametrize the utility functions of the two countries
using quasi-linear preferences, income effects are absent from the
demand for the global public good. Once again, the intention is
to illustrate the possibility that aid is motivated by the incentive
to mobilise collective action, rather than by any consideration of
international equity. The utility functions of the developed country
(country 1) and the developing country (country 2) are:
u1(x,y1) = y1+γ logx (21)
u2(x,y2) = y2+β logx (22)
where γ>β. This means that country 1 derives higher marginal
utility from the global public good at all levels of x.
Under private (national) provision, country 1 provides an
amount q¯1=γ, whereas country 2 free rides (q¯2=0). At this
competitive equilibrium x¯= q¯1+ q¯2=γ and u¯1(x,y1)=(m1−γ)+
γ logγ while u¯2(x,y2)=m2+β logγ. The constrained optimization
problem of the previous section using quasi-linear preferences can
be parametrized to describe the optimum subsidy country 1 would
offer. The associated Lagrangian is thus:
L(x,t,s;µ,λ) = m1(1−t)−sx+γ logx+ (23)
+µ[m2(1−t)+β logx−u¯2]+
+λ[t(m1+m2)−x(1−s)]
Assuming the exogenous parameters γ,β,m1,m2 are chosen in
a way that the optimum values of s and t are in the range
[0,1], we can ignore boundary solutions in the resolution of the
above problem. Let θ2=m2/(m1+m2) denote the income share
of country 2 in the world distribution of income. At a point (xˆ,tˆ,sˆ)
satisfying the first order conditions in relation to the Lagrangian
(23) we thus obtain:
xˆ = (γ+β) (24)
tˆ =
β
m2
log
(
xˆ
γ
)
(25)
sˆ = 1−
(
β
θ2xˆ
)
log
(
xˆ
γ
)
(26)
∂u1
∂y1
=
∂u2
∂y2
=λ (27)
λ = µ=1 (28)
Note that in the solution to this problem λ=µ=1. This result is
a consequence of the assumption of quasi-linear preferences where
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the marginal utility of income is constant and equal to one at all
income levels.
With quasi-linear preferences the optimum price pˆ=(1−sˆ) is a
function pˆ(1,γ,β,θ2), where 1 is the marginal cost of producing
the public good, γ and β measure the relative valuations of the
two countries for the public good 5 , and θ2=1−θ1 is a measure
of income inequality in the two-country world. Thus, pˆ(1,γ,β,θ2)
decreases with the income share θ2 of the free-riding country. Other
things equal, the optimum subsidy to a middle-income country
would be greater than the optimum subsidy to a low-income
country. This seemingly paradoxical result is best understood with
reference to (4). In the absence of income effects ∂u2/∂y2=1 and
the optimum value xˆ is independent of m2. Thus, the MRS of
country 2 (at constant utility u¯2) becomes flatter as m2 increases.
Consequently, the optimum tˆ that secures country 2’s participation
falls, and as a result sˆ must rise to ensure that the resource
constraint is satisfied. On the other hand, ∂sˆ/∂β<0: the more
the free-riding country values the public good, the higher the price
(1− sˆ) it would be asked to pay. Thus, in this two-country world
characterized by quasi-linear preferences, the optimum subsidy to
country 2 is shaped by incentive considerations, and this is likely to
be sharply different from subsidies premised on the usual altruism
arguments that are put forward in the aid literature.
Proposition 3 At a point ( xˆ,tˆ,sˆ) satisfying the first order
conditions in relation to the Lagrangian (23) where countries 1
and 2 have quasi-linear preferences, the optimum price of the global
public good is a function pˆ(1,γ,β,θ2), such that:
(i) pˆ decreases with the income share θ2 of the free riding
country.
Also,
(ii) pˆ increases with β, the intensity of the free-riding country’s
preference for the public good.
To illustrate, Table 1 reports the findings of a calibration of
the preferences and endowments of the two countries. Throughout
the calibration we set the preference parameters γ=1, β=0.5 and
m1=3 in relation to (21). We report the optimum values xˆ, tˆ and
sˆ as we vary the income share θ2 of the free-rider.
[Insert Table 1 here]
For a given value of β, as country 1 becomes richer the price
subsidy sˆ is increased, while the tax tˆ is reduced. Taking for
instance the value β=0.50, we have sˆ=0.46 when θ2=0.25, while
...............................................................................................
5At any level of global public activity xo,
∂u1/∂x
∂u2/∂x
|x=xo=γ/β.
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the price subsidy rises to sˆ=0.59 when θ2=0.33. From Corollary
3.2, we know that country 1’s welfare rises with m2 so that the
increased subsidy is all the more profitable from the perspective
of country 1.
When the welfare of the donor country depends on the efficiency
gains derived from collective action, the welfare of the donor
country increases with the income of the developing country. This
prediction (that a higher subsidy will be offered as the recipient’s
income increases) resonates with discussions of the importance of
mobilising such countries as China and India to make a meaningful
response to the challenge of global warming.
As β rises, country 1 reduces the subsidy element and offers
a contract with a higher tˆ. For instance, when β=0.75 and θ2=
0.25 (results not shown in the table), the price subsidy is virtually
nil (sˆ=0.04) while tˆ=0.42.
5. International treaties designed to share efficiency
gains.
It is now possible to compare the characteristics of tax-subsidy
arrangements that maximise the welfare of one country (as
in sections 2, 3 and 4) with characteristics of tax-subsidy
arrangements that share the gains of collective action. This section
of the paper focuses on outcomes that exist within the ellipse
illustrated in Figure 1. In the empirical calibrations in section 4
the tax is relatively large and the subsidy is relatively small (when
the cost-sharing function delivers all of the efficiency gains to the
developed country).
Of course, more generally, the policy instruments available
to negotiating parties may differ from those that have been
considered so far (there may be other policy instruments than
just a price subsidy and a tax). Also, more generally, it may not
always be possible to achieve Samuelson first best efficiency (as
there may also be second best considerations).
This section of the paper considers a general approach. Firstly,
we assume there are three homogenous groups of countries 6 (say
high, middle and low income countries) of respective sizes n1,n2
and n3. Within a group i=1,2,3, a given country has a utility
function ui(x,yi). In this approach any cost-sharing arrangement
is dependent on three functions Ei(x,η), i=1,2,3, where η is a
k−dimensional vector of parameters (to be chosen optimally) in a
...............................................................................................
6 It will be clear from the first order conditions below that the analysis
is equally applicable in the context of h=3,4,... groups of homogeneous
countries. The value of h=3 is chosen here for expositional purposes.
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way that
3∑
i=1
niEi(x,η)=x. Ei(x,η) is the total amount spent by
a representative country i on the global public good, so that yi=
mi−Ei(x,η). In the two-country discussion considered so far in
the paper η=(t,s), E1(x,η)=sx+tm1 andE2(x,η)=tm2. Another
example, discussed in section 2, is one where τ is the cost share of
country 1, E1(x,η)=τx and E2(x,η)=(1−τ)x.
Assume again that only rich countries provide x in the absence
of an international treaty, and let u¯3=u3[x,m3] denote the
reservation utility of a free-riding low-income country. An efficient
treaty, given the policy instruments Ei(x,η) will maximize the
welfare of the high-income community, u1[x,m1−E1(x,η)], given
that middle and low income countries are willing to participate
in the treaty, i.e. provided u2[x,m2−E2(x,η)]=uo2≥ u¯2, and
u3[x,m3−E3(x,η)]=u
o
3≥ u¯3. By varying the levels of u
o
2 and u
o
3,
we can envisage treaties that will share efficiency gains from those
that benefit only one party. Set µ1=1 and define the Lagrangian
of the problem as follows:
L(x,η;µ
2
,µ
3
,λ) = µ
1
u1[x,m1−E1(x,η)]+ (29)
+µ2 [u2[x,m2−E2(x,η)]−u
o
2]+
+µ3 [u3[x,m3−E3(x,η)]−u
o
3]+
+λ
[
3∑
i=1
niEi(x,η)−x
]
There are k+4 first order conditions: one for the optimum choice
of x, the level of global public activity, one equation in relation
to each of the parameters in η, one pertaining to the resource
constraint and, finally, two equations defining the welfare types 2
and 3 countries derive from the treaty:
∂L
∂x
=
3∑
i=1
µi
(
∂ui
∂x
−
∂ui
∂yi
∂Ei
∂x
)
+λ
(
3∑
i=1
ni
∂Ei
∂x
−1
)
=0 (30)
∂L
∂ηj
= −
3∑
i=1
µi
(
∂ui
∂yi
∂Ei
∂ηj
)
+λ
3∑
i=1
ni
∂Ei
∂ηj
=0 j=1,...,k (31)
∂L
∂λ
=
3∑
i=1
niEi(x,η)−x=0 (32)
∂L
∂µi
= ui[x,mi−Ei(x,η)]−u
o
i =0 i=2,3. (33)
The above equations define, in abstract form, necessary condi-
tions for Pareto efficiency given general cost functions Ei(x,η). To
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make these optimality conditions more transparent, consider, for
illustrative purposes, the case where the parties agree on a linear
cost sharing rule such that Ei(x,η)=τ ix. The above first order
conditions specialize to a seven equation system, characterizing
the optimum values of x, τ1,τ2 and τ3 :
∂L
∂x
=
3∑
i=1
µi
(
∂ui
∂x
−
∂ui
∂yi
τ i
)
+λ
(
3∑
i=1
niτ i−1
)
=0 (34)
∂L
∂τj
= −µi
∂ui
∂yi
x+λ
3∑
i=1
nix=0 j=1,2,3 (35)
∂L
∂λ
=
3∑
i=1
niτ ix−x=0 (36)
∂L
∂µi
= ui[x,mi−τ ix]−u
o
i =0 i=2,3. (37)
The solution to this problem is one where a first-best allocative
efficiency is obtained, i.e. a tangency on the contract curve in
Figure 1.
3∑
i=1
niΠi[x
∗,mi−Ei(x
∗,τ∗i )] = 1 (38)
λ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
(39)
µi =
ni
n1
∂u1/∂y1
∂ui/∂yi
i=2,3 (40)
Furthermore, for i=2,3 the welfare of the rich community increases
in community i’s income, but decreases in the welfare level
community i secures for itself.
If, again for illustrative purposes, we return to the two-
country case (n1=n2=1, n3=0, τ1=τ and τ2=1−τ) where both
countries have quasi-linear preferences, we find from (34)
γ
x
−τ+µ
(
β
x
−(1−τ)
)
=0 (41)
while (35) entails µ=1. The optimum thus has the same efficient
level of global public activity as encountered before, namely x∗=
γ+β. From the participation constraint (37), we obtain τ as a
function of uo2 :
τ∗=1−
(
β logx∗+m2−uo2
x∗
)
(42)
The above equation captures in a simple fashion several of the
themes developed in the paper, namely other things equal (i)
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country 1’s welfare increases with m2, (ii) country 1’s cost share
rises in the utility uo2 country 2 will manage to secure itself, and
finally (iii) country 1’s cost share is decreasing in β, the free-rider’s
valuation of the public good. We next proceed to illustrate these
findings with the help of a further calibration exercise.
In the calibrations of Table 2 we set m1=3, γ=1 and β=0.5
as in the calibrations of Table 1, and we fix the income share
of country 2 at θ2=0.25. Our purpose here is to calculate the
optimum cost-share τ∗ and the welfare u1 of country 1 as we
vary uo2. We normalize the welfare level of both countries by their
reservation utilities (1) and (2), so that u2/u¯2=1 corresponds to
a treaty where all the welfare gains accrue to country 1, and
u1/u¯1=1 corresponds to a treaty where country 2 reaps all the
welfare gains.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The results of the first row of Table 2 correspond to those of
the first row of Table 1 where xˆ=1.50, sˆ=0.46, tˆ=0.20 and the
developed country reaps all the welfare gains. Likewise, the results
of the fourth row of Table 2 where x˜=1.50, s˜=0.75, t˜=0.09 are
those where country 2 appropriates all the welfare gains from
the treaty. In the first row of Table 2, τ∗=0.86, whereas in the
fourth row, the cost share of country 1 rises to τ∗=0.93. Between
these two limiting cases, there exist treaties that benefit both
parties. In the third row for instance, u1/u¯1=1.03, u2/u¯2=1.05
and country 1’s cost-share stands at τ∗=0.90. We can now quite
simply envisage treaties that benefit both parties by continuously
varying u2/u¯2, while ensuring that the resulting value of τ
∗
remains between these critical bounds of 0.86 and 0.93.
6. Conclusions.
This paper describes international treaties that mobilise develo-
ping countries to contribute to the provision of a global public good
when developing countries can free-ride on developed countries’
contributions to produce a global public good. The good news is
that, even in the absence of an international authority (that is able
to tax nation states), international treaties are able to rely on tax-
subsidy arrangements to produce cost-sharing functions that will
mobilise voluntary collective action. When subsidies increase as
output increases, subsidies can be introduced to mobilise collective
action.
The bad news is that, international treaties that offer subsidies
to mobilise collective action can be designed to deliver all of the
efficiency gains to the countries that pay the subsidies. In the
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absence of an international authority to monitor and to regulate
the inducements implicit in these tax-subsidy arrangements,
international treaties may deliver all of the welfare gains to the
donor countries. If it is a convention that the altruist offers the
subsidy, developed countries are able to make the first move. They
are at an institutional advantage. As donors they set the subsidy.
As ‘donors’ they offer the tax-subsidy arrangement implicit in an
international treaty. They are able to set the subsidy to mobilise
collective action and to appropriate the efficiency gains. In the
absence of regulation, international treaties that ‘generously’ offer
subsidies to mobilise collective action can be designed to maximise
the welfare of the nation states that pay the subsidies.
When considering the pattern of international subsidies it
appears counter-intuitive that developed countries might offer
higher subsidies to developing countries that have higher levels
of income. This is at odds with expectations based on the
assumption that developed countries offer subsidies to alleviate
poverty. However, it is consistent with expectations premised
on the assumption that developed countries offer subsidies to
maximise their own welfare.
More generally it is possible to compare the properties of Pareto-
efficient treaties that advantage some countries with the properties
of Pareto-efficient treaties that advantage all of the nation states
that act collectively. The calibrations in this paper (premised,
albeit, on quasi-linear preferences) illustrate the sensitivity of
the distribution of welfare gains to changes in tax and subsidy
arrangements. The properties of these tax-subsidy arrangements
are important if policymakers are to ensure that every nation
state receives a meaningful share of the efficiency gains that they
generate when they act collectively.
The conclusions in this paper are also relevant when analysing
bilateral and multilateral aid arrangements. Critics have argued
that, when these subsidies displace conventional aid, the arran-
gements are unethical and inefficient (e.g. Anand 2004). One
advantage of the analysis presented in this paper is that it is
possible to address each concern separately. There are ethical
considerations even when international treaties (and aid packages)
achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome.
While the analysis suggests that the developed countries that
have already complied with the Kyoto treaty will be able to offer a
subsidy that will encourage developing countries to reduce carbon
emissions (e.g. as discussed at the U.N. Climate Conferences),
it calls in question the impact that a subsidy will exert on the
distribution of the efficiency gains. It offers a different perspective
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on the emphasis placed on encouraging commitments from middle-
income developing countries.
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in different
ways, e.g.
(i) The analysis is premised on a summation technology (Sandler
2004) and it is possible to compare the outcomes that would
emerge if there were different technologies to produce a global
public good (e.g. see Ihori 1996 and Jayaraman and Kanbur 1999).
(ii) The paper explores the normative effects of subsidies and
these are important if a political economy model is to be developed
to analyse the pressures that are likely to be exerted by different
groups in donor countries and in recipient countries. The gains
reported in this paper are likely to be appropriated by groups
that are able to exert political influence (e.g. Jones 2006).
While many future developments are possible, the important
message is that the subsidies developed countries offer to mobilise
developing countries can also be designed to appropriate the
efficiency gains that are delivered by collective action. It is far
from obvious that international subsidies provide any meaningful
assistance to recipient countries. If policymakers ignore the
possibilities illustrated in this paper, donors are able to employ
international subsidies to help themselves, rather than to help
others.
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Appendix
In this appendix we gather proofs of our main results.
Proof of Proposition 1 From (9), we have
∂u1
∂y1
=λ. Substi-
tuting for
∂u1
∂y1
in (8), we find that µm2
∂u2
∂y2
=λm2; viz. (12) .
Finally, substituting for the marginal utilities of both countries’
incomes using (11-12) in the first order condition (7), and dividing
throughout by λ, we obtain the Samuelson condition (10). 
Proof of Corollary 1 v1(m1,m2,u¯2) is a maximum value
function for the problem (6), where both Lagrange multipliers are
strictly positive. From the envelope theorem we readily obtain:
∂v1
∂m2
=
∂L
∂m2
=µ
∂u2
∂y2
(1− tˆ)+λtˆ (43)
From (12) µ
∂u2
∂y2
=λ. Hence
∂v1
∂m2
=λ(1− tˆ)+λtˆ=λ as required.
This establishes (i).
Applying the envelope theorem a second time we have
∂v1
∂u¯2
=
∂L
∂u¯2
=−µ (44)
Thus (ii) is also proven. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider the Lagrangian associated
with the multi-country model. This would take the form:
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L = n1u1(x,m1(1−t)−sx)+
+
n2∑
i=1
µ∗i [u2(x,m2(1−t))−u¯2]
+λ[t(n1m1+n2m2)−x(1−n1s)] (45)
We note that whatever allocation
(
xˆ,tˆ,sˆ
)
maximizes ku1(x,y1)
(where k>0), also maximizes u1(x,y1). Furthermore, we define
µ=
∑n2
i=1µ
∗
i . Thus, the point
(
xˆ,tˆ,sˆ
)
solution to the above
Lagrangian is also solution to (14). 

